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Abstract
We present a network agent-based model of ethnocentrism and intergroup cooperation in 
which agents from two groups (majority and minority) change their communality (feeling 
of group solidarity), cooperation strategy and social ties, depending on a barrier of “like-
ness” (affinity). Our purpose was to study the model’s capability for describing how the 
mechanisms of preexisting markers (or “tags”) that can work as cues for inducing in-group 
bias, imitation, and reaction to non-cooperating agents, lead to ethnocentrism or intergroup 
cooperation and influence the formation of the network of mixed ties between agents of 
different groups. We explored the model’s behavior via four experiments in which we stud-
ied the combined effects of “likeness,” relative size of the minority group, degree of con-
nectivity of the social network, game difficulty (strength) and relative frequencies of strat-
egy revision and structural adaptation. The parameters that have a stronger influence on the 
emerging dominant strategies and the formation of mixed ties in the social network are the 
group-tag barrier, the frequency with which agents react to adverse partners, and the game 
difficulty. The relative size of the minority group also plays a role in increasing the percent-
age of mixed ties in the social network. This is consistent with the intergroup ties being 
dependent on the “arena” of contact (with progressively stronger barriers from e.g. work-
mates to close relatives), and with measures that hinder intergroup contact also hindering 
mutual cooperation.
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1 Introduction
Ethnocentrism can be defined as the tendency for behaving differently towards people 
belonging to the same group (in-group) than towards people belonging to some other 
group (out-group) (LeVine and Campbell 1972). It can also be considered as a form of 
in-group bias, or as a tendency for cooperating with in-group members but not with out-
group members (Brewer 1999). Studies of ethnocentrism and ethnocentric behavior are 
often linked to the changing ethno-national landscape in many societies. Ethnocentrism 
is an ubiquitous behavioral pattern in societies, which although not necessarily imply-
ing hostility towards out-groups (xenophobia) is related to social phenomena ranging 
from voting behavior (Kinder 1998), to segregation and discrimination towards minority 
groups (Perreault and Bourhis 1999), and even ethnic conflict (Brewer 1979; Chirot and 
Seligman 2001) and war (van der Dennen 1995). There is strong empirical evidence for 
the prevalence of in-group bias in several contexts (Brewer 1979; Kramer and Brewer 
1984; Yamagishi and Mifune 2009). It is also well known that this can be triggered 
even by minimal cues that set arbitrary group boundaries (Tajfel et al. 1971; Doise et al. 
1972; Ahmed 2007), and that inequality hinders intergroup interactions while heteroge-
neity promotes them (Blau 1977).
Due to its importance within social sciences, ethnocentrism has been studied from 
the viewpoints of sociology (Blau 1977; McPherson et  al. 2001), social psychology, 
cognitive science, and also game theory (Axelrod 1984; Macy and Flache 2002; Dixit 
et  al. 2015), evolutionary dynamics and evolutionary biology (Smith 1982; Nowak 
2006b, a). More recently, ethnocentrism and related phenomena have been studied by 
means of modeling and simulation, using agent-based models (ABMs). Several ABMs 
have been proposed for describing outcomes of the interaction between populations of 
individuals with different characteristics, such as spatial segregation (Schelling 1971), 
local uniformity and global polarization of cultural traits (Axelrod 1997), ethnocen-
trism (Hammond and Axelrod 2006), and the link between individual strategies and the 
structural properties of social networks in which cooperation evolves (e.g. Santos et al. 
2006a, b; Pinheiro et al. 2012; Santos et al. 2006a).
In this paper we build on the models above and present a network ABM of “abstract” 
type for describing the co-evolution of ethnocentrism and social ties between two 
groups of unequal size. The model’s purpose is to describe how the patterns of in- and 
out-group cooperation and the structure of the network of mixed ties are influenced by 
relative group size, cooperation barriers and frequency of adaptation to adverse ties 
(non-cooperating link neighbors). The research questions we wanted to answer are:
1. How do the barriers of game difficulty and group tag influence the emergent strategies 
of the two groups?
2. What is the influence of structural adaptation on the emergence of full cooperation 
between the two groups?
3. What is the influence of relative size of the minority group and initial average connectiv-
ity on the emerging dominant strategies of each group and the formation of the network 
of mixed ties?
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The innovation of the present model with respect to previous ABMs related to accultura-
tion and ethnocentrism is the combination of (1) network (instead of spatial) interactions; 
(2) a tag-induced social barrier; and (3) a parsimonious model for the co-evolution of strat-
egy and structure within the network. This allowed us to show that the group-tag barri-
ers play a key role in determining which strategies will emerge as dominant, and that our 
model is capable of generating diversity, in the sense that strategies other than dominant 
persist within both minority and majority groups. Also, the agents’ ability to react to non-
cooperating partners promotes ethnocentric and full cooperation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we present an overview 
of ABMs that have been proposed for describing the emergence of ethnocentric behavior 
between groups and cooperation in networks that we use in our model. Section 3 contains 
a description of the model. In Sect. 4 we present the results of computer experiments that 
show the model’s capability for representing different outcomes of emergent strategies and 
mixed ties between the two groups. Sections 5 and 6 contain a discussion of the results and 
some notes about the model’s limitations, respectively. Finally, Sect. 7 contains a summary 
of conclusions and prospects for future work.
2  Theoretical background
Many ABMs have been proposed to describe social phenomena related to ethnocentrism 
and cooperation in spatial environments or networks. All these models are of the “abstract” 
type (Gilbert 2007), as their purpose is to describe the key mechanisms that explain emer-
gent (macroscopic) patterns in terms of a small number of agent types, endowed with sim-
ple interaction rules and behaviors. For example, Schelling’s model of spatial segregation 
(Schelling 1971, 2006) and Axelrod’s ABM of dissemination of culture (Axelrod 1997), 
describe spatial segregation due to homophily, and local uniformity/global polarization of 
cultural traits, respectively. However, these ABMs will not be further explored here, as they 
are not directly relevant to our model.
Hammond and Axelrod (2006) proposed an ABM for describing the emergence of eth-
nocentric behavior. In this model agents are of a single type and have three traits: a color/
ethnicity tag (with two possible values), cooperation/defection towards agents of the in-
group and cooperation/defection towards agents of the out-group. Hammond and Axelrod’s 
model is based on a combination of ideas from population dynamics (by including immi-
gration and death), and the PD framework (without iteration) for the agents’ interactions, 
and evolutionary models (agents die before transmitting their strategy traits to offspring 
if their potential to reproduce (PTR) is insufficient; and strategies suffer mutations in the 
reproduction process). The main finding of Hammond and Axelrod is that according to 
their ABM ethnocentric behavior strongly prevails under a wide range of conditions.
Hammond and Axelrod’s model has been criticized in several other aspects. For exam-
ple, this model does not take into account the mechanisms of reciprocity and transitivity 
(Nowak 2006b). Also, because offspring agents are created in their parents’ neighborhood, 
the emergent patterns result from kin selection instead of ethnocentrism (Jansson 2015).
One feature of most of the aforementioned models is that interactions between agents 
occur in neighborhoods of a spatial grid. This not only restricts the resulting emergent pat-
terns but also fails to represent many real life problems in which relevant interactions occur 
in networks (Epstein 2006). The literature on decision, strategic games and cooperation in 
networks is vast [see e.g. Jackson (2008), Ohtsuki et al. (2006) or Santos et al. (2006b)], so 
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we will only describe in greater detail the approach we found most useful for developing 
our model.
It is well known that models of cooperation in networks must combine strategy and 
structural changes (Skyrms and Pemantle 2000). The challenge has been to represent these 
mechanisms in a simple and parsimonious way. Santos et al. (2006a) proposed a model of 
cooperation in networks (hereafter called SPL) in which agents both change behavior and 
adjust their ties. In this model, agents are of a single type and play a social dilemma game 
with their link neighbors. They update their behavior (cooperate or defect) by imitating the 
strategy of link neighbors with a probability given by a logistic function of the difference 
between their respective payoffs. Agents also try to get rid of adverse ties (link neighbors 
that do not cooperate) by rewiring from defecting agents to link neighbors of the latter, 
with a probability that is also a logistic function of their respective payoffs. In this model 
no agents are created or die (no population dynamics). Also, rewiring can only occur if the 
network remains connected and strategy and structural updates are not simultaneous.
In the SPL model, the relative time scale of behavior and structural updates is controlled 
by a parameter 휏 such that 휏 = 0 leads to no structural updates (static networks) and 휏 = 1 
to no behavioral updates. The details of this model, as well as developments and appli-
cations can be found in e.g. Santos et al. (2006a, b), Pinheiro et al. (2012) and Pinheiro 
et  al. (2016). Santos et  al. (2006a) considered three social dilemmas of cooperation: the 
“Chicken run” (or “Snow drift”) game, in which players are greedy and prefer defection to 
mutual cooperation; the “Stag Hunt” game, in which cooperation entails a risk; and the PD 
game, which combines both greed and risk. The key results obtained with this model were 
that structural adaptation favors the emergence of cooperation and that there is a critical 
value for 휏 beyond which cooperators wipe out defectors (Santos et al. 2006a). This model 
is important for the present work because of its simplicity and generative power. Neverthe-
less, it does not describe strategy and structural updates arising from two groups (majority 
and minority) when some tag-induced barrier to cooperation exists. Therefore, it cannot 
represent how different combinations of in- and out-group strategies and the network of 
mixed ties emerge in a mixed artificial society. Our model attempts to improve these issues.
3  Model description
In this section we describe our proposed ABM. The model was implemented in NetLogo 
(Wilensky 1999). Experiments involving multiple sweeping parameters and outputs (e.g. 
global dependent variables, agent attributes, and networks) were run via a R-script using 
the RNetLogo (Thiele et al. 2012; Thiele 2014) and doParallel packages within R (R 
Core Team 2016).
3.1  Purpose, entities and scales
The model’s purpose is to describe the co-evolution of in- and out-group cooperation and 
inter-group ties for two groups connected in a social network, under the influence of tag-
induced barriers to cooperation.
The model entities are the agents and a social network that connects them. Agents 
belong to two groups, defined by a group tag with values “blue” and “green” for major-
ity and minority groups, respectively. They have an attribute called “communality,” which 
in abstract stands for “feeling of group solidarity, ” and that we model as the payoff of a 
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social dilemma game as described next. At each time step, they can change their commu-
nality by trying to play a social dilemma game with their link neighbors. The probability 
of a successful pairwise interaction (leading to one-shot game play) is conditioned by their 
individual “likenesses” (or “affinities”) towards each other, which depends on the groups 
to which the interacting agents belong. This setting of the micro-interactions is consistent 
with Blau’s theory of intergroup contact (Blau 1977) and the McPherson et al. (2001) the-
ory on the importance of homophily in shaping social networks (McPherson et al. 2001). 
Agents then try to improve their communality by either revising their strategies or by get-
ting rid of non-cooperative partners.
Table 1 summarizes the mechanisms and processes considered in the model. There is 
general empirical evidence that an in-group bias exists in many contexts (Tajfel et al. 1971; 
LeVine and Campbell 1972; Brewer 1979). Introduction of a tag-induced barrier for con-
ditioning the success (or effectiveness) of individual interactions is a simple form of rep-
resenting this bias. Barriers to cooperation and strategy changes are basic mechanisms in 
the context of social dilemma games (Rapoport 1999; Nowak 2006a; Dixit et  al. 2015). 
Finally, the coupling of strategy and structural changes is a key mechanism for modeling 
the emergence of cooperation in networks (Skyrms and Pemantle 2000; Ebel and Born-
holdt 2002; Santos et al. 2006a).
Tables 2 and 3 show the global variables and the agents’ attributes, respectively. The 
meaning of the variables and attributes will be explained below, as they are progressively 
introduced. The total number of agents is determined by the numAgents global varia-
ble. The number of agents of each group is set by fixing the proportion of “green” agents 
(propGreen). In this work, the “green” population will be the minority group. The social 
network is initialized using the small-world model (Watts and Strogatz 1998), with initial 
average node degree (initial average number of link neighbors of the agents) and rewiring 
probability defined by the nW and prewire global variables, respectively. In this way the arti-
ficial society (including both populations) is initially connected so that the clustering coef-
ficient is high and the “social distance” is controlled by prewire.
The model is based on network interactions only, and therefore space scales need not 
be considered. Since the model is of “abstract” type, the time scale is also indefinite. For 
example, the average node degree can represent the number of interactions in one day, one 
week or a different time interval. In this way, the simulations’s duration could then repre-
sent different periods.
3.2  Agents’ interactions and behavior
In this model agents connected by a network link interact by playing a two-person pris-
oners’ dilemma (PD) game with their link neighbors, whose payoff is the communality. 
Agents attempt to increase their communality by either revising their strategy (cooperation 
of defection) towards agents of the in- and out-groups, or by changing their link neighbors 
(as in Santos et al. 2006a). Whether a pair of agents connected by a network link (Fig. 1) 
will play a cooperation game depends on the group-tag barrier.
For each agent pair, the group tag barrier is determined by the values of the agents’ (hetero-
geneous) “likenesses” towards each other, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The two agents Ai and Aj 
will interact if X ∼ U(0, 1) < min(Ai[likenessOther],Aj[likenessOther]) , where U(0, a) is the uniform 
distribution with support [0, a] . Thus, the “less friendly” of the two agents (i.e. the one with 
smallest “likeness” towards the potential partner) will determine the maximum probability of 
successful interaction. Agents that have low “likeness” towards others can still interact, and 
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Table 2  Global variables
Variable Symbol Range/values Meaning/context
numAgents Nagents 500–10000 Number of agents (population setup)
numCycles Ncycles 1–1000 Duration of simulation
groupTags  {횋횕횞횎, 횐횛횎횎횗} Group tags (population setup)
propGreen Pgreen 0–1 Proportion of green agents (population setup)
initialAver-
ageNodeDe-
gree
nW 2 − Nagents Initial average node degree (network initialization)
pRewire prewire 0–1 Rewiring probability in small-world network 
(network initialization)
likeness
L =
[
lBB lBG
lGB lGG
] 0–1 (all entries) ‘Origin barrier’ (initialization of agents’ attributes)
gamma 훾 0–20 ‘Cooperation barrier’ (game strength)
W W 0–20 Ratio of structural to strategy updates
Table 3  Agent attributes Attribute Symbol Range/values
groupTag  blue, green
likenessOwn lown 0–1
likenessOther lother 0–1
횂 = (횜횝횛횊횝횎횐횢홾횠횗, 횜횝횛횊횝횎횐횢홾횝횑횎횛) (sin, sout) CC, CD, DC, DD
communality  0–∞
Fig. 1  Illustration sketch of the interaction barrier. Agents Ai and Aj interact pairwise. They will “like” each 
other with a probability proportional to the corresponding entry in the likeness matrix L. If they succeed, 
then they will play a one-shot PD game
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agents with high “likeness” may not necessarily interact. Therefore, the group-tag barrier is 
applied with an element of randomness, which in this case represents the effect of noise in 
individual decisions (Skyrms and Pemantle 2000).
When two agents connected by a link are able to interact, they play a one-shot PD game 
whose payoff is communality. The PD was chosen instead of other social dilemma games 
(“Chicken run” and “Stag-hunt”) because it entails a stronger tension between full coopera-
tion, ethnocentrism or purely greedy behavior than the other two games (Macy and Flache 
2002). However, other types of games could easily be implemented in the model.
In the PD game agents can cooperate or defect according to the groupTag of the other 
agent and their individual strategies towards in- and out-group members. Using the stand-
ard notation, both agents receive communality R (reward payoff) or P (punishment pay-
off) if they both cooperate or defect, respectively. When one of the players defects and the 
other cooperates, the defector gets a communality T (temptation payoff) and the defector 
gets a communality S (sucker payoff). For the game to be a PD, the payoffs must verify 
the relationship T > R > P > S (Macy and Flache 2002). Since the payoff is expressed in 
an interval scale (i.e. the outcome of the game does not change if the payoff is subject 
to a linear map of the form y = a ⋅ x + b , with a > 0 (Rapoport 1999), we can set R = 1 
and P = 0 without loss of generality. To further simplify the game, we set T = 1 + 훾 and 
S = −훾 , where the parameter 훾 can the interpreted as a “cooperation barrier” (or “strength” 
of the game). In this way, the payoff matrix (M) is
where the row labels are the strategies of the first player and the column labels those of the 
second player.
After agents play with all their link neighbors they try to improve their communality 
in the next round by either changing their strategy or their link neighbors. This process is 
modeled using an adaptation of the SPL model of cooperation in networks (Santos et al. 
2006a). Following Santos et al. (2006a), at each time step agents revise their strategy  or 
change their social ties, with relative frequency set by the input parameter W. For W → 0 
the agents will have progressively higher inertia towards changing their social ties, whereas 
for large W they will react quickly to non-cooperative neighbors.
The process of strategy update for an agent Ai is sketched in Fig. 2. Agent Ai selects 
the link neighbor Aj with which it played the PD game (i.e. they “liked” each other in the 
last round of the game) with the larger number of link neighbors (maximum “popularity”). 
Then, Ai imitates the strategy pair of Aj with probability P given by:
where 훽 = 0.005 , (Ai) is the communality of Ai and (Aj) the communality of Aj (see San-
tos et al. (2006a) for the foundation and details).
Figure 3 illustrates the process of structural update for an agent Ai . The agent picks at 
random one of its link neighbors Aj with more than one link. If in the last round Aj did not 
play with Ai or played and defected, then Ai will pick at random one of Aj ’s link neighbors, 
Ak , and replace the link with Aj with a link to Ak with probability P given by (see Santos 
et al. (2006a) for the foundation and details):
(1)
(2)P =
1
1 + exp(훽 ⋅ ((Ai) − (Aj))
A network agent-based model of ethnocentrism and intergroup…
1 3
where 훽 = 0.005 , (Ai) is the communality of Ai and (Aj) the communality of Aj . This 
leads to agents severing social ties with defectors and agents they don’t “like” or “under-
stand,” and searching for cooperators among the link neighbors of the agents they want to 
(3)P =
1
1 + exp(훽 ⋅ ((Aj) − (Ai))
Fig. 2  Illustration sketch of the strategy update step. An agent Ai copies the strategy of the link neighbor 
that he “likes” and “understands” with largest communality ( Aj ), with a probability given by a logistic func-
tion
Fig. 3  Illustration sketch of the 
structural update. Agent Ai com-
petes with agent Aj which is a 
defector, to create a link to agent 
Ak (link neighbor of Aj)
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get rid off. A link with another agent is not severed if it is the only link the other agent has, 
to ensure that the network remains connected.
3.3  Process overview and scheduling
The model has two main procedures, setup and go. The setup procedure clears all 
variables from the previous simulation, initializes the global variables, creates the agents’ 
list, and connects the agents in a small-world network with average node degree and rewir-
ing probability given by nW and rewiring probability prewire , respectively (Watts and Stro-
gatz 1998). For each agent, the groupTag attribute is randomly assigned with proportion 
determined by the Pgreen input parameter.
The initial strategies are assigned as follows. For each agent, the attributes strategy-
Own and strategyOther are randomly assigned using the entries of the likeness matrix 
L, as follows. For a generic agent Ai , if 횐횛횘횞횙횃횊횐(Ai) = 횋횕횞횎 , the cooperation strategies 
towards in- and out-group members are assigned with probabilities
and if 횐횛횘횞횙횃횊횐(Ai) = 횐횛횎횎횗 with probabilities
In this way, the likeness matrix is used both for setting the barrier to successful interactions 
and initialization of the agents’ strategies. This avoids introducing extra parameters for ini-
tialization and is easily extensible to cases with more than two groups.
The go procedure implements the model cycle. Each cycle consists of the following 
operations:
1. Reset the agents’ communality to 0.5;
2. For each agent pair determine whether or not the agents will play a cooperation game. 
They will do so with a probability of liking each other determined by the entries in the 
L matrix;
3. Each agent pair with enough mutual “likeness” plays a PD game, and the agents’ com-
munality is updated depending on their respective strategy pairs;
4. All agents individually decide to revise their strategies towards in- and out-group (social 
influence) or change its neighbors (social selection), depending on the input parameter 
W;
5. Increment the time cycle, and update the display if the model is run in interactive mode.
3.4  Validation, parameterization and calibration issues
We validated our model by observing, for different experiments, whether the results were 
coherent with fundamental anticipated outcomes summarized in Table 4 below. For exam-
ple, lower values of “likeness” and higher values of 훾 should invariably lead to difficulty 
of cooperation, and structural rigidity ( W = 0 ) to impossibility of the network of mixed 
ties to grow, while producing plausible values for the variations of the emergent pat-
terns of dominant strategies and network properties. Since our ABM is of “abstract” type 
(4)P(sin(Ai) = C) =lBB
(5)P(sout(Ai) = C) =lBG,
(6)P(sin(Ai) = C) =lGG
(7)P(sout(Ai) = C) =lGB.
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parameterization and calibration were done by setting different experiments for character-
izing the model’s sensitivity to each parameter, comparing the impact of each parameter 
relative to the others, and finding parameter ranges that lead to sharp changes of the emer-
gent patterns of dominant strategies for each group and the structure of the social network.
4  Results
In this section, we present the results of four experiments for different combinations of 
the global variables that we expected to have the most significant effect on the model’s 
behavior, as shown in Table  4. More specifically, the proportion of the minority group 
(propGreen) and the tag-induced barrier (likeness) are key variables in theories on 
intergroup conflict and cooperation (Allport 1958; Blalock 1967). The connectivity (ini-
tialAverageNodeDegree) is also a key parameter, as postulated by group contact 
theories (Allport 1958; Blumer 1958). Finally, the game strength (gamma) and the adap-
tivity (W) were shown to play a key role for describing cooperation in networks (Santos 
et al. 2006a). In each experiment, four different global variables were swept simultaneously 
and the patterns of dominant strategy for each group and of the percentage of mixed ties 
were analyzed. The purpose of each experiment was to show whether the emergent pat-
terns were coherent with the effects shown in Table 4, as well as the relative importance of 
each global variable on the model’s behavior.
Twenty simulations were performed for each of the 500 different combinations of the 
values of the input variables in all experiments. The results at the end of the simulations 
(500 cycles) were averaged over the twenty runs and represented in the form of facets plots.
4.1  Experiment 1
The purpose of this experiment was to study the effect of the combined variations of like-
ness towards in-group, likeness towards out-group, relative size of minority group (  ) and 
initial average connectivity ( nW ), keeping the game barrier ( 훾 ) and frequency of strategy 
updates (W) constant. The likeness towards in- and out-group was set equal for both groups 
(i.e. lBB = lGG and lGB = lBG).
Figures 4 and 5 show the facets plots of the dominant strategies within the “blue” and 
“green” populations, respectively, at the end of each run (500 cycles) and averaged over 
Table 4  Expected effect global variables on the model’s behavior, with the remaining variables held con-
stant
Variable Expected effect
propGreen Full cooperation and % of mixed ties increase with % of minority group
initialAverageNodeDe-
gree
Full cooperation and % of mixed ties increase with initial connectivity
likeness Difference of “likeness” towards in- and out-group influence whether 
in-group or full cooperation will prevail
gamma Increasing 훾 first induces defection towards group with smaller “like-
ness” and then full defection
W Increasing W promotes cooperation
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twenty runs. In these plots, each of the four possible strategies is represented by a different 
color. Because not all agents have the same strategy at the end of the simulations, the % of 
the agents that have the dominant strategy is represented using a transparency 훼 scale.
The first aspect to notice is that there is virtually no difference between these two plots. 
This was to be expected in this case, since the “likenesses” towards in- and out-group were 
identical for both populations. Therefore, in subsequent experiments where this condi-
tion holds, only the plots for the dominant strategy of the majority group will be shown. 
Although the plots show the dominant strategies, the shadings of each small tile show that 
in many cases other strategies were also present within the two groups.
Another aspect to notice that all the four strategies can come out as dominant, depend-
ing on the relative values of the “likeness” towards in- and out-group. The point in the 
{likenessOwn, likenessOther} plane which seems to divide the regions where 
each strategy dominates is strongly dependent on these two “likenesses” but is relatively 
insensitive to the relative size of the minority group and the initial average node degree.
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Fig. 4  Facets plot of the dominant strategy within the “blue” (majority) population after 500 cycles, 
obtained in experiment 1
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Figures  6 and 7 show the average node degree for the “blue” and “green” popula-
tions, respectively. By observing the color values corresponding to each value of nW 
in the facets plot in Fig.  6, it is apparent that the average node degree at the end of 
the simulations is clearly dependent on the initial average node degree. Thus, the rel-
ative size of the minority group has a weaker influence on the % of mixed ties than 
the initial degree of connectivity. This is consistent with Blau’s macro-sociological 
theory of social structure, according to which the degree of connectivity is the major 
structural factor influencing intergroup relations (Blau 1977). Also, the average node 
degree increases with the “likeness” towards in-group and decreases with the “likeness” 
towards the out-group, as was expected from the arguments in Table 4.
The facets plot of the average node degree of the “green” population in Fig. 7 shows 
a qualitatively different behavior than that depicted in Fig. 6. Since the color scales are 
the same in both figures, it is observed that when the “likeness” towards the out-group 
is larger than the “likeness” towards the in-group (upper left corners in each heat map) 
the minority group ends up with a larger average node degree than the majority group. 
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Fig. 5  Facets plot of the dominant strategy within the “green” (minority) population after 500 cycles, 
obtained in experiment 1
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Also, the average node degree of the minority group is strongly dependent on all four 
sweeping variables.
The conditions leading to larger average node degree for the minority also lead to 
smaller average node degree of the majority. One interesting aspect to notice is that the 
average node degree increases with the “likeness” towards out-group and decreases with 
the “likeness” towards in-group, which is the reverse of the result for the majority popu-
lation. Also, for low values of lGG and high values of lGB the node degree increases for 
decreasing size of the minority group. Thus, according to our model, agents belonging to 
a minority group can get a larger average connectivity than a majority group, by having a 
significantly higher “likeness” towards the out-group than towards the in-group.
Figure 8 shows the percentage of the mixed ties (i.e. those with agents belonging to dif-
ferent groups) in the social network. The results show that the formation of a network of 
mixed ties requires high ‘’likeness” towards the out-group and low “likeness” towards the 
in-group, as was expected (based on the arguments in Table 4). This result is consistent 
with the findings by McPherson et al. (2001). The increasing relative size of the minority 
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Fig. 6  Facets plot of the average node degree (number of link neighbors) for the “blue” (majority) popula-
tion after 500 cycles, obtained in experiment 1
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group also promotes the formation of mixed ties. This too was expected, for the increasing 
percentage of the minority group within the mixed population increases the initial prob-
ability of interaction between agents belonging to different groups. The influence of the 
initial degree of connectivity is weaker than that of the relative size of the minority group.
4.2  Experiment 2
The purpose of this experiment was to study the effect of the combined variations of like-
ness towards in-group, likeness towards out-group, relative size of minority group  and 
W (which controls adaptivity), keeping the initial average connectivity nW , and 훾 constant. 
More specifically, we were interested in determining whether the relative size of the minor-
ity group has a stronger influence on the qualitative behavior of the solutions or vice-versa.
The initial average node degree was set at the constant value nW = 16 . The sweep-
ing variables were the size of the minority group and the “likenesses,” which were set 
Pgreen = 0.1 Pgreen = 0.15 Pgreen = 0.2 Pgreen = 0.25 Pgreen = 0.3
n
w  = 8
n
w  = 12
n
w  = 16
n
w  = 20
0.0 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.8
0.0
0.4
0.8
0.0
0.4
0.8
0.0
0.4
0.8
0.0
0.4
0.8
l BB=lGG
l B
G
=l
G
B
10
20
30
Degree
Green (minority) population − average node degree
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as in experiment 1, and the frequency of structural to strategy updates, which was set 
W = {0, 1, 5, 10}.
Figures 9 and 10 show the facets plots of the dominant strategy for the “blue” (majority) 
population and the percentage of mixed ties in the social network, respectively, at the end 
of each run (500 cycles) and averaged over twenty runs. These results confirm the well-
known fact that adaptivity plays a key role for promoting cooperation in networks (Santos 
et al. 2006a, b). If the network is kept rigid ( W = 0 ), the dominant strategy is full defection 
(DD) for almost all pairs of values of the “likenesses” and mixed ties do not form. For slow 
adaptivity ( W = 1 ), the dominant strategy is full defection except for relatively high values 
of lBB = lGG and lBG = lGB , which is consistent with the general theory of the PD game 
(Macy and Flache 2002; Dixit et al. 2015; Santos et al. 2006a). For W ≥ 1 the transitions 
from ethnocentric behavior (dominant CD) to full cooperation are determined by the “like-
ness” towards the out-group. Analysis of Figs. 9 and 10 also suggests that adaptivity has a 
stronger influence on the resulting dominant strategies than the relative size of the minority 
group.
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Figure 10 shows that when the network is rigid ( W = 0 ) the percentage of mixed ties in 
the network is low, regardless of the “likenesses.” This was expected, because if the net-
work is static the “likenesses” towards in- and out-group influence strategy changes but not 
structural updates. For W > 0 the percentage of mixed ties is large for high values of the 
“likeness” towards the out-group and increases with both the relative size of the minority 
group and the frequency of structural updates.
4.3  Experiment 3
The purpose of this experiment was to study the effect of the combined variations of like-
ness towards in-group, likeness towards out-group, size of minority group  and 훾 (game 
barrier), keeping the initial average connectivity nW , and W constant. This experiment was 
important to confirm that increasing the cooperation barrier (game strength) would lead to 
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cooperation to be wiped out, and determine whether or not the relative size of the minority 
group could significantly influence the value of 훾 for which full defection will result.
The initial average node degree was set at the constant value nW = 16 . The sweeping 
variables were the size of the minority group and the “likenesses,” which were set as in 
experiment 1, and the game barrier parameter, which was set 훾 = {1, 5, 10, 20}.
Figure 11 shows the facets plots of the dominant strategy for the “blue” (majority) pop-
ulation. This shows that in our model 훾 has indeed a strong impact on the dominant strate-
gies, with an effect that is contrary to that of W.
For low values of the game barrier (or strength) any of the four possible strategies can 
emerge as dominant, depending on the group-tag barrier (“likeness”). For 훾 = 1 and 5, the 
effect of the relative size of the minority group on the emergence of ethnocentric or full 
cooperation is small. In contrast, increasing the value of 훾 from 1 to 5 leads to full defec-
tion, unless at least one of the “likenesses” is sufficiently high.
For 훾 = 10 ethnocentrism and full cooperation are only possible for very high values of 
“likeness” towards the in-group and large relative group size of the minority. The shading 
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of tiles to the rightmost columns of the tiles for 훾 = 10 shows that on average cooperation 
does not extend to more than 40% of the population (the results for the minority group are 
similar to those in Fig. 11). For 훾 = 20 cooperation is wiped out completely.
Figure 12 shows the percentage of mixed ties in the social network after 500 cycles. 
For 훾 = 1 and 5, the results are similar to those obtained in experiment 2 and shown in 
Fig. 10 for the cases of W > 0 , with the difference that increasing 훾 has the same effect as 
decreasing W. For 훾 = 10 and 20, the percentage of mixed ties increases with the relative 
size of the minority group. This result can be interpreted as follows. For large values of 훾 
full defection dominates, but since agents are allowed to adjust their ties ( W > 0 ) they con-
tinually search for (nonexistent or rare) cooperators.1 In these conditions, the influence of 
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obtained in experiment 3
1 This qualitative behavior is somewhat analogous to that in Schelling’s segregation model when both the 
spatial agent density and the “%-similar-wanted” are high, and agents just cannot find a spot where they are 
“happy” with their neighbors.
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the group-tag barriers is no longer dominant (bottom row of tiles in Fig. 11) and the agents 
become indifferent to the group where they try to find cooperators. The larger relative size 
of the minority group then increases the probability of formation of mixed ties.
4.4  Experiment 4
The purpose of this experiment was similar to that of Experiment 1, but for a non-sym-
metric likeness matrix, to determine whether or not different different dominant strat-
egies would emerge in the majority and minority groups. The initial average connectiv-
ity nW and the relative size of the minority group Pgreen were set as sweeping variables, 
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with the values shown in Table  5 for experiment 1. The other sweeping variables were 
lBG = {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8} and lGB = {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}.2
Figures 13 and 14 show the facets plots of the dominant strategy for the “blue” (major-
ity) and “green” (minority) populations, respectively. These plots show that for the condi-
tions of this experiment (particularly the fixed values of 훾 and W adopted) the dominant 
outcome is ethnocentrism, with full cooperation setting in for larger values of the “like-
nesses” towards the out-group, as expected. However, it can also be observed that except 
for a few cases the dominant strategy at the end of the simulations (averaged over all runs) 
turned out to be identical for both groups. The outcomes are also noisy, in the sense that 
the patterns of the transition from ethnocentrism to full cooperation are not clear. These 
shortcomings call for further study and refinement of the model.
5  Discussion
The experiments showed that the group-tag barrier (“likeness” L), frequency of structural 
adaptation W and game strength W are the variables with stronger impact on the resulting 
dominant strategies in our model. The relative size of the minority group and initial degree 
of connectivity do not affect the emergent strategies, but influence the resulting % of mixed 
ties in the network. These general findings are consistent with previous results by Blau 
(1977) and Santos et al. (2006a).
The results of experiment 1 showed that according to our model, the group-tag barriers 
can tip the dominant strategy towards any of the four possible outcomes, but diversity of 
strategies tends to persist. Both these features can be considered realistic. The relative size 
of the minority group and the initial degree of connectivity influence the % of mixed ties at 
the end of the simulations. For high values of “likeness” towards the out-group, the minor-
ity can actually ended up with larger average node degree than the majority group. The 
difference between the average connectivity within majority and minority groups is also 
Table 5  Default values of the 
input variables for experiments 
reported in this work. These 
values are common to all 
experiments, unless stated 
otherwise
Variable Range/values
numAgents 1000
numCycles 500
propGreen {0.1,0.15,0.20,0.25,0.30}
initialAverageNodeDegree {8,12,16,20}
pRewire 0.25
gamma 2
W 5
횕횒횔횎횗횎횜횜BB {0.0,0.25,0.50,0.75,1.00}
횕횒횔횎횗횎횜횜GG = 횕횒횔횎횗횎횜횜BB
횕횒횔횎횗횎횜횜BG {0.0,0.25,0.50,0.75,1.00}
횕횒횔횎횗횎횜횜GB = 횕횒횔횎횗횎횜횜BB
2 The values of l
BG
 and l
GB
 used in this experiment are slightly different to those in the table 5, so that a 
small bias towards in-group will remain.
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representative of real societies, but it may also be associated with limitations of the model, 
as discussed below.
The results of experiments 2 and 3 showed that 훾 and W have a strong impact on the 
emergence of cooperation, with opposite effects—the former hinders cooperation, whereas 
the latter induces it. These results are consistent with the general theory of the PD game 
(e.g. Dixit et al. 2015) and the models of games in networks (Santos et al. 2006a). When 
the network is not allowed to adapt, cooperation is strongly hindered and the % of mixed 
ties is totally dependent on initialization.
In experiments 1–3, the model yielded the same dominant strategies for both minority 
and majority groups. This was expected, since the “likenesses” towards in- and out-group 
were set equal for both majority and minority groups. In experiment 4, non-symmetric 
“likeness” matrices were imposed in a situation where either ethnocentric or full coop-
eration was expected. Although in some cases the dominant strategies of the two groups 
were different, there is a very strong tendency for the model to yield the same dominant 
structure for both majority and minority groups. This shows that after multiple iterations 
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the mechanism of imitation on which the strategy update is based leads to the “likeness” 
barrier to becoming ineffective. Therefore, according to this model, simple imitation does 
not lead to diversity of cooperative behavior.
6  Model limitations
Our model has some limitations, which are inherent to the variables and constructs used, 
and to limited representation of the mechanisms of cooperation and structural adaptation.
Considering first the issue of variables’ and constructs, the intra- and inter-group rela-
tions were modeled using a single network and “communality” was taken as an abstract 
representation of feeling for group support. Although the latter is indeed a basic human 
need, social ties can be of multiple types (family, friends, acquaintances, workmates, 
etc.), each of which entails different levels of “communality” that are not easy to relate. 
Although our model cannot represent the joint effect of these influences, it is possible to 
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simulate networks corresponding to different “arenas” (e.g. close friends or acquaintances) 
by setting the “likeness” and game barrier so that more intimate relationships would be 
more difficult to form. The formation of family ties, such as marriages and offspring, would 
require a much more complex model.
Although the mechanisms represented in the model are key, and their combination with 
group tag barriers provided plausible outcomes for the in- and out-group strategies and 
the networks of intra-group relationships, other important mechanisms were not modeled. 
First, memory of past interactions and implementation of simple strategies such as Tit-for-
tat, Generous Tit-for-tat, or Grimm (Axelrod 1984; Nowak 2006a), in combination with the 
model of probabilistic imitation and structural change would provide a better representa-
tion of reciprocity.
Another limitation of the model is reseting the communality at each cycle. This limita-
tion is common to many existing models, including the Hammond/Axelrod and Jansson 
models of ethnocentrism (Hammond and Axelrod 2006; Jansson 2015) and the SPL model 
of cooperation in dynamic networks (Santos et al. 2006a) and arises from the need to keep 
the communality stable at the individual and global level throughout the simulations. This 
limitation can only be overcome by considering the cost of maintaining social ties, but 
modeling this jointly with the strategy and structure updates while keeping the model par-
simonious is indeed a challenging topic.
The constraint of keeping the network connected (as in Santos et  al. 2006a) is also a 
limitation. This is necessary to avoid dissolution of the network into isolated nodes, par-
ticularly for low “likenesses” and strong cooperation barriers. This constraint is not unreal-
istic, for in real societies individuals are generally not completely isolated. This limitation 
is related to the one mentioned in the previous paragraph. Rewiring to neighbors of neigh-
bors is also a potential limitation, but other alternatives would be equally open to criticism.
Two further limitations of the model are the use of fixed “likeness” barriers and the 
absence of population dynamics (such as offspring and immigration). Inclusion of these 
processes while preserving the simplicity of the model is also a challenging topic.
7  Conclusions
In this work we presented a network ABM of “abstract” type for describing the co-evolu-
tion of ethnocentrism and social ties between two groups (majority and minority). In this 
model, agents have a group tag (“blue” or “green”) and a pair of strategies for cooperating 
or defecting when interacting with agents of identical or different tags (in- and out-group, 
respectively), as well as an attribute called “communality” that represents feeling of “group 
solidarity” and is modeled as the payoff of a social dilemma game. Interactions between 
pairs of agents are successful or unsuccessful depending on their relative “likeness.” If an 
interaction is successful, agents change their communality by playing a one-shot Prisoners’ 
Dilemma (PD) game, and try to improve their communality by revising their strategy of by 
modifying their social ties.
The results of the computer experiments showed that the model can produce outcomes 
with each of the four possible strategies (full defection, cooperation towards out-group, 
cooperation towards in-group or ethnocentrism, and full cooperation) emerging as domi-
nant. We now summarize how the results contribute to answer our research questions.
Regarding the first research question, the group-tag barriers defined via the “like-
ness” matrix L play a key role in determining which strategy will emerge as dominant. 
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The results also show that the model generates diversity, since strategies other than domi-
nant persist within the majority and minority groups. Apart from the group-tag barrier, 
the two other parameters which have a strong impact on the outcomes are the frequency 
of structural updates W and the game barrier (or strength) 훾 , which have opposite effects. 
Increasing W promotes ethnocentric and full cooperation, whereas increasing 훾 wipes out 
cooperation within the social network, leading to full defection. One important feature of 
our model is that strategies other than the dominant persist within both the majority and 
minority groups. To the best of our knowledge, this outcome is not well described in previ-
ous studies.
Exploring our second research question, we found that the frequency of structural 
updates also influences the formation of mixed ties within the social network. When the 
network is kept rigid ( W = 0 ) the social network is entirely dependent on initialization and 
there is no possibility for a network of mixed ties to grow. One interesting result is that 
when the “likenesses” towards the out-group are sufficiently large, the average node degree 
(and hence the communality) of the minority group can be substantially higher than that of 
the majority group. This behavior was also not reported in previous studies.
Finally, in answer to our third research question, we found that according to our model 
the relative size of the minority group and the initial network connectivity have a weaker 
impact on the resulting dominant strategies than the variables mentioned before, but influ-
ence the percentage of the network of mixed ties connecting agents belonging to different 
groups.
In most simulations, the model yielded the same dominant strategies for both minority 
and majority groups, even when the tag-induced barriers were specified to be non-sym-
metric. This tendency for a common dominant strategy to emerge may be due to limited 
representation of the mechanisms of cooperation in the model.
The model described herein is part of work in progress and can be improved in many 
ways by incorporating more complete and realistic mechanisms. One of these is the influ-
ence of memory and learning effects in the evolution of individual strategies, instead of 
simple imitation. Another possible improvement is the representation of the group-tag 
barriers as a multiple-feature variable that can change in the course of interactions. Still 
another possible improvement is the formulation of a model of structural adaptation with a 
variable number of ties including both the reinforcement due to past successful interactions 
and the cost of keeping social ties.
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